We propose a meta-heuristic approach for solving nonlinear dynamic tracking games. In contrast to more "traditional" methods based on linear-quadratic (LQ) techniques, this derivative-free method is very flexible (e.g. to introduce inequality constraints). The meta-heuristic is applied to a...

We demonstrate that in simple 2 X 2 games (cumulative) prospect theorypreferences can be evolutionarily stable, i.e. a population of players withprospect theory preferences can not be invaded by more rational players. Thisholds also if probability weighting is applied to the probabilities of...

We study how the framework of classical game theory changes whenthe preferences of the players are described by Prospect Theory (PT)and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) instead of Expected UtilityTheory. Specically, we study the inuence of framing eects and probabilityweighting on the existence...

We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under...

This paper introduces the notion of mixed leadership in non-zero-sum differential games, where there is no fixed hierarchy in decision making with respect to the players. Whether a particular player is leader or follower depends on the instrument variable s/he is controlling, and it is possible...

We give a mechanism fully implementing envy-free divisions such that: strategy spaces are symmetric, the set of Nash equilibria is a global attractor for the best-reply dynamics. As a byproduct, undesired mixed-strategy equilibria are weeded out by the adjustment process

In this paper we consider the linear quadratic differential game for descriptor systems that have index one. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium

This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of...