In models of dynamic multilateral bargaining, the literature tends to focus on stationary subgame perfect or stationary Markov perfect equilibria, which restrict attention to forward-looking, history-independent strategies. Evidence supporting such refinements come from environments in which...

The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium proposals in the alternating offers model, also for positive time between proposals. As time vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is...

This paper explores the set of stochastically stable equilibria in a model in which individuals first decide to make a high or low investment, and then are matched to play a Nash demand game. If an agreement is not reached, then they are re-matched in the next period, and obtain a payoff...

This chapter focuses on the noncooperative models of bargaining. John Nash's (1950) path- breaking paper introduces the bargaining problem, and his pioneering work on noncooperative bargaining theory was taken up again and developed by numerous authors. The target of such a noncooperative theory...

We model a situation in which two players bargain over two issues (pies), one of which can only be resolved at a future date. We find that if the players value the issues asymmetrically (one player considers the existing issue more important than the future one, while the other player has the...

Using a sequential model of multilateral bargaining involving one buyer and two sellers, who are selling objects which are imperfect compliments for the buyer, we analyse buyer's preferred bargaining order i.e. whether the buyer prefers to buy higher valuation object first or second. For a...