We study the managers' compensation schemes adopted by publicly listed family firms by means of a theoretical model and … an empirical analysis. Existing empirical literature finds puzzling evidence about the structure of family CEOs' pay …, which apparently contradicts the fundamental tenets of principal-agent theory under moral hazard. In particular, family CEOs …

factors: family ownership and source of the competitive pressure. A novel aspect of our paper is that we rely on two … predictions, sensitivity is higher in competitive sectors and the difference between family and non-family CEOs disappear when … competition is tough. Family CEOs are significantly less paid than non-family CEOs and their pay is significantly related to firm …

. This paper develop a model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use … employee ownership as a reward management tool whereas bad managers would implement it for entrenchment motives. We bring about … three main conclusions: (i) Bad managers use employee ownership as an entrenchment mechanism. (ii) This latter phenomenon …

post payouts to managers are largely determined by the ex ante contract terms …