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The paper studies procurement contracts with pre-project investigations in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. To model the procurer's roblem, we extend a standard sequential screening model to endogenous information acquisition with moral hazard. The optimal contract displays...
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strategies. We derive the class of optimal mechanisms and show that it has a deferred acceptance auction representation. This … feature guarantees an implementation with a descending clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks …
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services per year, we leverage our characterization of the optimal mechanism to study the design of first-price-auction …
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strategies. We derive the class of optimal mechanisms and show that it has a deferred acceptance auction representation. This … feature guarantees an implementation with a descending clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011633851
settings in which the class of optimal mechanisms has a deferred acceptance auction representation which allows an … implementation with a descending-clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks descend synchronously such …
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