We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the effect of increasing the number of competing employers from two to three. In all treatments, more efficient workers invest more often in education and employers offer...

We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the effect of increasing the number of employers from two to three. In all treatments, there is a strong tendency to separate. More efficient workers invest more often and...

In dieser Studie wird die Wirkung der Rekrutiererfreundlichkeit und -kompetenz auf den Bewerber und dessen Absicht, den Bewerbungsprozess weiter zu verfolgen, empirisch analysiert. Als theoretisches Fundament dienen das Signaling und die Theory of Reasoned Action. Unter Zuhilfenahme eines...