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Self-correcting mechanisms in public procurement : why award and contract should be separated
Bös, Dieter; Kolmar, Martin - 2000
In public procurement a temporal separation of award and actual contracting can frequently be observed. In this paper … we give an explanation for this institutional setting. For incomplete procurement contracts we show that such a … post-award, pre-contract rent-seeking activities also increase efficiency. This is always the case if the procurement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539673
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Self-correcting mechanisms in public procurement : why award and contract should be seperated
Bös, Dieter; Kolmar, Martin - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001510204
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A dynamic theory of regulatory capture
De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2021
Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012491609
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A dynamic theory of regulatory capture
De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2020
ineffective standard anti-corruption practices, such as whistle-blowing protection policies. We highlight that closing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012220065
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Political Contestability and Public Contracting
Moszoro, Marian W. - 2018
, part of the lack of flexibility in the design and implementation of the public procurement process reflects public agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012940346
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Delegation and information revelation
Gautier, Axel; Paolini, Dimitri - 2000
This paper addresses the question of delegation in an organisation where there is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. We assume that the principal cannot use revelation techniques à la Baron Myerson to elicit agent's superior information and in contrast, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608611
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On platforms, incomplete contracts, and open source software
Niedermayer, Andras - 2007
We consider a firm A initially owning a software platform (e.g. operating system) and an application for this platform. The specific knowledge of another firm B is needed to make the platform successful by creating a further application. When B's application is completed, A has incentives to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316074
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Signaling an outside option
Ohlendorf, Susanne; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2009
We consider the case of an upstream seller who works to improve an asset that has been specialized to a downstream buyer's needs. The buyer then makes a take it or leave it offer to the seller about how the future surplus should be split. We assume that the seller from the outset has private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909276
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Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2020 - Revised version
We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration -...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012318860
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Sticks and Carrots in Procurement
Bigoni, Maria - 2014
buyers' offers become more generous. Buyers tend to prefer penalties, which may explain why they are dominant in procurement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013070449