this settlement negotiation. We study the characteristics of equilibrium contracts in settings where this leverage effect … most two contracts, which under-insure low-risk types and may inefficiently induce high-risk types to litigate. In a …

acquire costly unobservable information about it before taking the decision. The problem has features of moral hazard and … hidden information since the acquisition of information and its content are unobservable to the principal. The optimal …

Firms often motivate their workers with implicit incentive contracts. Since these contracts are sustained through the … gains available for up front extraction. Disclosure of the workers' productivity information to outside labor market affects … turnover with the sustainability of implicit contracts. I formalize this trade-off, and characterize the optimal disclosure …

class of symmetric equilibria. For the first case, the surplus to sharing information increases with higher volatility of …

cost information. The OEM can contract with the two suppliers either simultaneously or sequentially. We consider both cases …

prices and real economic activity. I show that under short-sale constraints security prices contain less information. However … opportunity from market prices and have additional private information. In a setting with investment complementarities, this leads …

scheme in which both consumers and providers rate each other to reduce the information asymmetry on both sides of the market …