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An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions

Barberà, Salvador - In: Social choice and welfare 18 (2001) 4, pp. 619-653

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001614158

Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains : characterization results

Barberà, Salvador; Berga Colom, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 41 (2012) 4, pp. 791-808

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009684243

Preference for flexibility and the opportunities of choice

Barberà, Salvador (contributor); Grodal, Birgit (contributor) - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001717399

Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes

Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - In: Social choice and welfare 16 (1999) 2, pp. 321-336

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001364041

Pairwise justifiable changes in collective choices

Barberà, Salvador; Berga Colom, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo; … - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012821879

Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models

Barberà, Salvador; Berga Colom, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - In: Games and economic behavior 131 (2022), pp. 1-28

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013253274

Preference for flexibility and the opportunities of choice

Barberà, Salvador; Grodal, Birgit - In: Journal of mathematical economics 47 (2011) 3, pp. 272-278

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009422747

Information disclosure under strategyproof voting rules

Barberà, Salvador; Nicolò, Antonio - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590713

The role of domain restrictions in mechanism design : ex post incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency

Barberà, Salvador; Berga Colom, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872382

Maximal Domains of Preferences Preserving Strategy-Proofness for Generalized Median Voter Schemes

Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - 2008

We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202538