In March 2010, Japanese regulators implemented the country's first legislation concerning the disclosure of director compensation for named individuals. Using the first publicly available data for Japanese executives, we document direct evidence on the level, structure, and mechanisms of CEO...

This M.A. dissertation presents a study of the influence of financial distress on CEO compensation in the United States. It focuses on the four main components of executive compensation: salary, bonus, restricted stock and stock options. More specifically, I apply linear regression to panel data...

We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk-taking. The overall net effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk-averse CEOs. To overcome the endogeneity of option grants, we exploit institutional features of multi- year compensation plans, which generate...

We investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms embedded in CEO cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. For a sample of U.S. and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower the default risk of a bank. However, we find...

The objective of this paper is to define the relationship between a set of factors and CEO compensation that will enable companies to imply better corporate governance practices in their management process. Developed econometric model is tested on the data of US telecom companies for the period...