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Does CEO pay dispersion matter in an emerging market? : evidence from China's listed firms
Hu, Fang; Pan, Xiaofei; Tian, Gary Gang - In: Pacific-Basin finance journal 24 (2013), pp. 235-255
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010346770
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Does CEO duality give more influence over executive pay to the majority or minority shareholder? : (a survey of Brazil)
Abraham, Enoima; Singh, Gurcharan - In: Corporate governance : the international journal for … 16 (2016) 1, pp. 96-115
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011490470
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Political connections and agency conflicts : the roles of owner and manager political influence on executive compensation
Ding, Shujun; Jia, Chunxin; Wilson, Craig; Wu, Zhenyu - In: Review of quantitative finance and accounting 45 (2015) 2, pp. 407-434
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333106
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CEO compensation in EU telecom companies : does the state design the right incentives?
Cambini, Carlo; De Masi, Sara; Paci, Andrea; Rondi, Laura - In: Telecommunications policy : the international journal … 42 (2018) 6, pp. 474-488
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010345
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Executive directors' compensation and monitoring : the influence of gender diversity on Spanish boards
Baixauli-Soler, J. Samuel; Lucas-Perez, M. Encarnacion; … - In: Journal of business economics and management 17 (2016) 6, pp. 1133-1154
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626011
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Top-executives compensation : the role of corporate ownership structure in Japan
Mazumder, Mohammed Mehadi Masud - In: Journal of Asian finance, economics and business : JAFEB 4 (2017) 3, pp. 35-43
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011917498
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The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium
Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010345872
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The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium
Chaigneau, Pierre - 2017
We consider a model of CEO selection, dismissal and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975704
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Revisiting executive pay, firm performance, and corporate governance in China
Bin, Leo; Chen, Jianguo; Ngo Anh Xuan - In: Economics, management and financial markets 15 (2020) 1, pp. 9-32
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012239643
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The effect of monitoring on CEO compensation in a matching equilibrium
Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas - In: Journal of financial and quantitative analysis : JFQA 53 (2018) 3, pp. 1297-1339
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011930415