We examine the influence of proxy advisors on firms’ shareholder engagement behavior. Our analyses exploit a quasi-natural experiment using Say-On-Pay voting outcomes near a threshold that triggers a review of engagement activities by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Firms receiving...

We examine the influence of multiple board directorships and boards' committee memberships on three board supervisory outcomes: executive remuneration, external auditor opinion and earnings management. The study uses a panel of 122 non-financial companies listed on the Spanish Stock Exchange...

We investigate the key contractual features of CEO performance-vested (p-v) equity compensation. We hypothesize that contractual features such as relative performance evaluation (RPE), the performance period length, and the number of performance metrics can be configured to improve the...

We analyze a hand-collected dataset of 1669 executive compensation packages at 34 firms included in the main German stock market index (DAX) for the years 2006- 2014 in order to investigate the impact of the 2009 say on pay legislation. First, we observe that the compensation packages of...

Modern remuneration systems for executive directors include substantial elements of performance based pay. The idea behind this is that by rewarding executives for performance their interests become aligned with those of the company's shareholders, thus bridging the principal-agent gap....

We examine the effect of liability protection on the compensation of directors and on takeover outcomes. Consistent with the hypothesis that directors require additional compensation if they bear liability, we find that director compensation is higher for firms that provide less liability...

We use an unanticipated court ruling in a lawsuit against Citigroup claiming corporate waste related to CEO pay to analyze court intervention as an alternative governance mechanism in cases of excess pay. We find a negative relation between announcement returns and excess pay, consistent with...

We analyze a hand-collected dataset of 1682 executive compensation packages at 34 firms included in the main German stock market index (DAX) for the years 2009-2017 in order to investigate the impact of the 2009 say on pay legislation. The findings provide important insights beyond the German...

In 2002, the United Kingdom adopted a regulation allowing shareholders to cast non-binding (advisory) votes on their firm's Directors' Remuneration Report during annual general meetings (the 'Say-on-Pay' rule). This study evaluates a decade of this regulation and examines how it affected the...