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Selecting a social choice rule : an exploratory panel study

Sertel, Murat R.; Kara, Ayça E. G. - In: Advances in economic design : with 28 tables, (pp. 19-52). 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003871660

Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? : An exploratory panel study

Kara, Ayça E. Giritligli; Sertel, Murat R. - In: Social choice and welfare 25 (2005) 1, pp. 43-73

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003263105

Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners

Sertel, Murat R.; Sanver, M. Remzi - In: Social choice and welfare 22 (2004) 2, pp. 331-347

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001968973

The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable

Sertel, Murat R.; Yilmaz, Bilge - In: Social choice and welfare 16 (1999) 4, pp. 615-627

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001421783

Designing mechanisms, in particular for electoral systems : the majoritarian compromise

Hurwicz, Leonid; Sertel, Murat R. - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001561922

The Majoritarian Compromise is Majoritarian-Optimal and Subgame-Perfect Implementable

Sertel, Murat R.; Yilmaz, Bilge - 2000

It is shown that the Majoritarian Compromise of Sertel (1986) is subgame-perfect implementable on the domain of strict preference profiles, although it fails to be Maskin-monotonic and is hence not implementable in Nash equilibrium. The Majoritarian Compromise is Pareto-optimal and obeys SNIP...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184242