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Male-Female Productivity Differentials: The Role of Ability and Incentives
Paarsch, Harry J.; Shearer, Bruce S. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2004
We consider the response to incentives as an explanation for productivity differences within a firm that paid its …: one due to differences in ability and the other due to differences in the response to incentives. We apply this … that individuals do react differently to incentives. However, while the women in our sample reacted slightly more to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100605
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Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents
Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude; Helm, Carsten - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2004
We analyze a two-task work environment with risk-neutral but inequality averse individuals. For the agent employed in task 2 effort is verifiable, while in task 1 it is not. Accordingly, agent 1 receives an incentive contract which, due to his wealth constraint, leads to a rent that the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696275
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Autonomy, Contractibility and the Franchise Relationship
Lewin-Solomons, S. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2000
not depended on costs, despite such an arrangement creating distorted incentives for the chain. Why? One possible answer … would create incentives for a chain to interfere with franchisee actions, thus undermining innovative behaviour and reducing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783775
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Status Incentives with Discrete Effort: A Note
Dey, Oindrila; Banerjee, Swapnendu - In: Economics Bulletin 34 (2014) 2, pp. 1205-1213
Using a moral hazard framework with limited liability with discrete effort levels we show that status incentives help … in partially reducing the burden on monetary incentives. Yet, the disutility accruing from failure to achieve status …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010835900
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Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure
Falk, Armin; Ichino, Andrea - 2003
While confounding factors typically jeopardize the possibility to use observational data to measure peer effects, field experiments offer the possibility to obtain clean evidence. In this paper we measure the output of four randomly selected groups of individuals who were asked to fill letters...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261951
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When Randomization in Collective Tournaments is Profitable for the Principal
Lehmann, Stefanie Aniela - 2008
incentives and accordingly is not in the principal’s interest. In this paper I compare two different designs of a collective …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270007
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Labor-Market Conditions and Leadership Styles
Dur, Robert; Kvaløy, Ola; Schöttner, Anja - 2020
Why do some leaders use praise as a means to motivate workers, while other leaders use social punishment? This paper develops a simple economic model to examine how leadership styles depend on the prevailing labor-market conditions for workers. We show that the existence of a binding wage floor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012497761
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Labor-market conditions and leadership styles
Dur, Robert A. J.; Kvaløy, Ola; Schöttner, Anja - 2020
Why do some leaders use praise as a means to motivate workers, while other leaders use social punishment? This paper develops a simple economic model to examine how leadership styles depend on the prevailing labor-market conditions for workers. We show that the existence of a binding wage floor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012315429
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Tractability in Incentive Contracting
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509464
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Dynamic Incentive Accounts
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier; Sadzik, Tomasz; Sannikov, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008477185