This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a finite sequence of exogenously specified TU-games. Three different core concepts are presented: the...

This paper is the first to introduce an algorithm to compute stationary equilibria in stochastic games, and shows convergence of the algorithm for almost all such games. Moreover, since in general the number of stationary equilibria is overwhelming, we pay attention to the issue of equilibrium...

In this paper we prove the following fixed point theorem. Consider a non-empty bounded polyhedron P and a function ƒ : P → P such that for every x є P for which ƒ (x) ≠ x there exists δ 0 such that for all y, z є B (x, δ) ∩ P it holds that (ƒ(y)-y)2 (ƒ(z)-z) ≤ 0, where B (x, δ)...

We consider a robotic flowshop model in which a single robot is responsible for the transportation of parts between machines and the amount of time that a part spends on a machine must be comprised in some predefined interval. The objective is to find a feasible schedule with minimal cycle time....

Technological innovations and growing consumer demand have led to a variety of design and expansion problems in telecommunication networks. In particular, local access net- works have received a lot of attention, since they account for approximately 60% of total investments in communication...

We develop an algorithm that solves the constant capacities economic lot-sizing problem with concave production costs and linear holding costs in O(T³) time. The algorithm is based on the standard dynamic programming approach which requires the computation of the minimal costs for all possible...

We consider the problem of reallocating the total initial endowments of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. With the uniform reallocation rule we propose a solution which satisfies many appealing properties, describing the effect of population and...

By virtue of the Kemeny distance strategy-proofness of preference rules is defined. It is shown that a preference rule, which assigns a complete relation to every profile of complete relations is non-imposed and strategy-proof if and only if it is pairwise voting in committees. So,...

We consider the problem of (re)allocating the total endowment of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences and initial endowments. We propose an extension of the so-called uniform rule and show that it is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto...

Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and iterative methods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed in the literature. We propose a new method, where the power of a node is determined by both the number of...