will not want to disclose match information. If legal, the low-quality firm rival would like to advertise match information … consume the low quality product: this effect can dominate the benefits from improved consumer information and reduce social …Consumer information on products affects competition and profits. We analyze firms' decisions to impart product …

Improved consumer information about (symmetric) products can lead to better matching but also higher prices, so … more information, so both effects benefit consumers. This is when comparative advertising is used, against a large firm by … a small one. Comparative advertising, as it imparts more information, therefore helps consumers. While it also improves …

monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers. We then study the effect of noise on … output, market price, information flows, and expected profits. The presence of noise may reduce the informational externality … due to asymmetric information, which increases the firm's expected profits. …

equilibrium. We first study the behavior of the monopoly when price conveys information about quality. We then show the effect of …We present a diagrammatic and step-by-step analysis of price signaling quality. Because quality is a continuum on the … information flows on welfare, i.e., profit and consumer surplus. …

quality - and in monopoly case. We would like to investigate how competition among platforms and the entry deterrence behavior … might a§ect the equilibrium, with particular focus on quality provision. …

downgrades quality whereas the seller sometimes upgrades it. Our model of targeting with endogenous product quality provides some … new insights into the way the transition from mass to specialized advertising can affect market outcomes. Quality …

Economists have emphasized the role of dissipative advertising and price as signals of quality. Most works, however …, limit the number of types to two options: high and low quality. Yet, production costs and quality both result from R … quality and marginal cost are both subject to chance. In a static framework (no repeat purchases and no informed consumers …

conformity. In equilibrium, both quality and cost leaders choose higher advertising intensities and charge higher prices than …

downgrades quality whereas the seller sometimes upgrades it. Our model of targeting with endogenous product quality provides some … new insights into the way the transition from mass to specialized advertising can affect market outcomes. Quality …

Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the … unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: In the first one, firms disclose … quality; in the second one, they send costly signals thereof. Under non-comparative advertising a firm advertises its own …