In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with...

I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with...

I give short and constructive proofs of Tarski's fixed-point theorem, and of a much-used extension of Tarski's fixed-point theorem to set- valued maps.

We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure...