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Ransomware and reputation
Cartwright, Anna; Cartwright, Edward - In: Games 10 (2019) 2/26, pp. 1-14
through reputation. We demonstrate that there are situations in which it is optimal for the criminal to always return the … files and situations in which it is not. We argue that the ability to build reputation will depend on how victims … they need to find ways of building a good reputation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061894
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Inflated reputations : uncertainty, leniency, and moral wiggle room in trader feedback systems
Bolton, Gary E.; Kusterer, David J.; Mans, Johannes - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 65 (2019) 11, pp. 5371-5391
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012125974
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Whom can you trust? : reputation and cooperation in networks
King, Maia - 2017
Community enforcement is an important device for sustaining efficiency in some repeated games of cooperation. We investigate cooperation when information about players' reputations spreads to their future partners through links in a social network that connects them. We find that information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011773641
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Dispute resolution or escalation? : the strategic gaming of feedback withdrawal options in online markets
Bolton, Gary E.; Greiner, Ben; Ockenfels, Axel - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 64 (2018) 9, pp. 4009-4031
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011921466
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Money talks : rebate mechanisms in reputation system design
Li, Lingfang; Xiao, Erte - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 60 (2014) 8, pp. 2054-2072
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403575
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Trust and reputation under asymmetric information
Janas, Moritz; Oljemark, Emilia - 2020 - Version: September 10, 2020
We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if the trustee is privately informed about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422494
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Reputation and trust of principals and agents in interorganisational relations : the case of interdisciplinary research cooperation
John, Michael; Kloyer, Martin; Fleßa, Steffen - In: International journal of innovation management : IJIM 28 (2024) 1/2, pp. 1-43
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576920
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Communication, feedbacks and repeated moral hazard with short‐lived buyers
Jullien, Bruno; Park, In-Uck - 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181935
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Calculating the reputation of a reviewer
Narayanan, Surya - In: Entrepreneurship and development in the 21st century, (pp. 231-240). 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012161990
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Binding and non-binding contracts : a theoretical appraisal
D'Agostino, Elena; Lisciandra, Maurizio - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 14 (2018) 2, pp. 1-27
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011929003