Showing 11 - 20 of 3,564
A theory of salesforce compensation plans is presented where the sales of a product depend not only on the salesperson's effort but also on the uncertainty in the selling environment. The firm chooses a compensation plan to maximize its profit taking into account the salesperson's likely effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008787767
This paper considers the question of how a sales manager should design the optimal compensation scheme for his salesforce when it consists of salespersons of varying selling skills, i.e., when the salesforce is heterogeneous. The manager's problem is to reward the salespersons based on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008787802
Since the papers of Basu et al. (1985) and Lal and Srinivasan (1993), marketing academics have been interested in the design and implementation of optimal compensation plans. The literature has focused on agency theory as a foundation to help describe and understand this process. Although there...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005674226
Much of the salesforce compensation literature has focused on developing incentive schemes to maximize effort levels on the part of the salesforce. The amount of effort to expend in the selling task is considered to be the sole decision variable for a sales representative. In this paper, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008789679
Our primary objective in this paper is to analyze a framework that simultaneously examines the role of monitoring and incentives in the design of sales force control systems. Previous research has focused exclusively on the role of incentives in directing salesforce effort. We build on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008789842
We study contracting when both principal and agent have to exert noncontractible effort for production to take place. An analyst is uncertain about what actions are available and evaluates a contract by the expected payoffs it guarantees to each party in spite of the surrounding uncertainty....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440091
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015143877
This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities. They can observe and verify each others’ effort levels and draft enforceable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240825
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010229350
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009688698