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Contract theory in the spotlight : Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize winners
Fleckinger, Pierre; Martimort, David - In: Revue d'économie politique 128 (2018) 4, pp. 493-533
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011943020
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Risky utilities
Rochet, Jean-Charles; Roger, Guillaume - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 62 (2016) 1/2, pp. 361-382
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011554281
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Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
Dilmé, Francesc - In: Games and economic behavior 113 (2019), pp. 116-136
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012174470
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The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
Chaigneau, Pierre; Edmans, Alex; Gottlieb, Daniel - In: Games and economic behavior 113 (2019), pp. 743-755
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012174541
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Borrower private information covenants and loan contract monitoring
Carrizosa, Richard; Ryan, Stephen G. - In: Journal of accounting & economics 64 (2017) 2/3, pp. 313-339
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011783383
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Discussion of "borrower private information covenants and loan contract monitoring"
Nikolaev, Valeri V. - In: Journal of accounting & economics 64 (2017) 2/3, pp. 340-345
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011783401
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Private contracting with externalities : Divide and conquer?
Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Shaffer, Greg Eric - In: International journal of industrial organization 50 (2017), pp. 460-472
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011820582
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An analysis of net-outcome contracting with applications to equity-based compensation
Hofmann, Christian; Huddart, Steven J.; Pfeiffer, Thomas - In: Review of accounting studies 28 (2023) 3, pp. 1657-1689
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014383868
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Contract design with socially-attentive preferences
Koch, Simon; Sarbu, Miruna; Weinschenk, Philipp - 2019
The standard agency model assumes that the agent does not care how his decisions influence others. This is a strong assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are effective also with sociallyattentive agents, the principal may optimally set none. This could explain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012268393
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Inefficiency and regulation in credence goods markets with altruistic experts
Farukh, Razi; Kerkhof, Anna; Loebbing, Jonas - 2020
, price regulation should be accompanied by licensing arrangements that cap the number of experts in the market. Our theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431181