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Group contests with internal conflict and power asymmetry
Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - 2014
We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467392
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Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups and free riding
Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - 2009
We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good where each member of a group has a different benefit from the good. Our model can be interpreted in two ways: Each of the players has a non-linear investment cost in the contest, or alternatively, the returns to effort are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336001
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Cooperation and effort in group contests
Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - 2011
We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336057
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Coopetition in group contest
Kiss, Hubert J.; Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso; Zhukova, Vita - 2019
There are situations in which competitors ally to pursue a common objective. This simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition is called coopetition and we study it theoretically and experimentally in a group contest setup. More concretely, we analyze a group contest with a new sharing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012016453
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Cooperation and effort in group contests
Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - 2011
We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009383068
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Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups and free riding
Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - 2009
We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good where each member of a group has a different benefit from the good. Our model can be interpreted in two ways: Each of the players has a non-linear investment cost in the contest, or alternatively, the returns to effort are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003817303
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Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry
Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - 2014
We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members' efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010480849
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Does the endowment of contributors make a difference in threshold public games?
Alberti, Federica; Cartwright, Edward - 2010
case because there is an incentive to free ride and the possibility to do so creating a conflict of interest. -- Public …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008749645
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Social motives in intergroup conflict
Weisel, Ori; Zultan, Ro'i - 2013
We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the … framing and symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by … to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009792169
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Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game
Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi; Herrmann, Benedikt; … - 2009
We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to … punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that … conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003799822