We study portfolio choice with multiple stocks and capital gain taxation assuming that capital losses can only offset current or future realized capital gains. We show through backtesting, using empirical distributions, that optimal equity holdings over an extended period are significantly lower...

We consider the portfolio delegation problem in a world with potentially incomplete contingent claim markets. A principal hires an agent to manage a portfolio. When the agent has limited liability (that is, there is a lower bound on the compensation contract), she may have an incentive to take...

We provide a detailed characterization of arbitrage-free asset prices in the presence of capital gains and income taxes. The distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we impose on the model two important features of the tax code: the limited use of capital losses and the inability to wash...

Fama(1984) analyzed the variability and the covariation of risk premiums and expected rates of depreciation. We employ three statistical techniques that do not suffer from a potential bias in Fama's analysis, but we nevertheless confirm his findings. In contrast to his interpretation the results...

The theoretical nature of risk premiums in foreign currency futures markets is derived and studied empirically. Estimation problems encountered in using futures data are discussed. Since forward rates and futures prices are demonstrated to be approximately equal, and because risk premiums in...

This paper examines the determination of risk premiums in foreign exchange markets. The statistical model is based on a theoretical model of asset pricing, which leads to severe cross-equation constraints. Statistical tests lead to a rejection of these constraints. We examine the robustness of...

This paper identifies several social-choice correspondences which are or are not fully implementable in economic environments when agents are incompletely informed about the environment. The authors show that in contrast to results in the case of complete information, neither efficient...

For some game theoretic solution concepts, such as dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium, and undominated strategies, only dictatorial social choice functions are implementable on a full domain of preferences with at least three alternatives. For other solution concepts, such as the iterative...

For some game theoretic solution concepts, such as dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium, and undominated strategies, only dictatorial social choice functions are implementable on a full domain of preferences with at lest three alternatives. For other solution concepts, such as the iterative...