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Desinvestitions-Management : Erfolgsfaktoren in der Verhandlungsphase eines Sell-Offs

Defren, Timo (contributor) - 2009

gelingt, das Informationsproblem des Käufers zu überwinden. Die Folge sind sich hinauszögernde Verhandlungen und die Erzielung …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014014849

Informed agent's advice in bargaining under two-sided incomplete information

Kim, Sanghoon - In: Journal of economics 143 (2024) 2, pp. 183-205

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015130601

Bargaining with incomplete information : an axiomatic approach

Rosenmüller, Joachim - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013456412

A multi-attribute double auction and bargaining model for emergency material procurement

Zhang, Meng; Kong Zhaojun - In: International journal of production economics 254 (2022), pp. 1-18

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013461615

Bargaining under almost complete information

Basak, Deepal - In: Journal of economic theory 214 (2023), pp. 1-46

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014540724

Ultimatum bargaining with envy under incomplete information

Gonzalez-Sanchez, Eric; Loyola, Gino - In: Mathematical social sciences 127 (2024), pp. 1-11

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014558613

Entscheidungsunterstützung in elektronischen Verhandlungen : eine Analyse unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von unvollständigen Informationen

Reiser, Andreas - 2013

Verhandlungsunterstützungssysteme bieten verschiedene Methoden zur Entscheidungsfindung für komplexe, integrative Geschäftsverhandlungen. Andreas Reiser untersucht die mangelnde Berücksichtigung unvollständiger Informationen dieser Systeme, zeigt Probleme auf, die hierbei entstehen können...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014275463

Experimental analysis of endogenous institutional choice : constantly revealing versus ad-hoc contracting

Di Cagno, Daniela; Ferrari, Lorenzo; Güth, Werner; … - 2021 - This draft: September 1, 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013257694

Optimal Imperfect Commitments in a Negotiation with a Deadline

Cunyat, Antoni - 2002

One major finding of the bargaining literature is that the more irrevocable a commitment is, the better for the committed player. One notable exception is Fershtman and Seidmann (1993) bilateral negotiation where the commitment not only does not improve the committed player's payoff but also it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035357

Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values

Heller, Yuval; Kuzmics, Christoph - In: Games and economic behavior 143 (2024), pp. 51-76

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014450004