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Effect of matching mechanism on learning in games played under limited information

Feltovich, Nick; Oda, Sobei Hidenori - In: Pacific economic review 19 (2014) 3, pp. 260-277

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503064

Interlinkage and generous tit-for-tat strategy

Matsushima, Hitoshi - In: The Japanese economic review : the journal of the … 65 (2014) 1, pp. 116-121

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010425072

Behavioral theory of repeated prisoner's dilemma : generous tit-for-tat strategy

Matsushima, Hitoshi - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 20 (2020) 1, pp. 1-11

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012170701

Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics

Foster, Dean P.; Hart, Sergiu - In: Games and economic behavior 109 (2018), pp. 271-293

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012173212

Collusion under imperfect monitoring with asymmetric firms

Garrod, Luke; Olczak, Matthew - In: The journal of industrial economics 65 (2017) 3, pp. 654-682

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011776155

High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring

Lehrer, Ehud; Solan, Eilon - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 1, pp. 87-113

We study two-player discounted repeated games in which one player cannot monitor the other unless he pays a fixed amount. It is well known that in such a model the folk theorem holds when the monitoring cost is on the order of magnitude of the stage payoff. We analyze high frequency games in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855848