Markets differ in the availability of past trading records of their participants. In a repeated sale model with adverse selection, we study the impact of the availability of such records on trading outcomes. We consider regimes varying with respect to the length of the available records. We...

We consider repeated trading by sellers with persistent private information in dynamic lemons markets. We compare the outcomes of a transparent market where past trading prices are public to those of an opaque market, where they are private. We characterize the upper bound of trading surplus in...

In a North-South vertically differentiated duopoly, the analysis in this paper derives equilibrium government policies towards parallel imports. By incorporating strategic interaction at the policy-setting stage and the product market, the model sheds new light on (i) the effects of parallel...

In a North-South vertically differentiated duopoly, the analysis in this paper derives equilibrium government policies towards parallel imports. By incorporating strategic interaction at the policy-setting stage and the product market, the model sheds new light on (i) the effects of parallel...

We study a variation of the one-sector stochastic optimal growth model with independent and identically distributed shocks where agents acquire information that enables them to accurately predict the next period’s productivity shock (but not shocks in later periods). Optimal policy depends on...

We show that global trade negotiations can prevent global free trade. In a simple model where global tariff negotiations precede sequential Free Trade Agreement (FTA), we show FTA formation can expand all the way to global free trade in the absence of global tariff negotiations but global free...

In a two-country Hotelling type duopoly model of price competition, we show that parallel import (PI) policy can act as an instrument of strategic trade policy. The home firm's profit is higher when it <i>cannot</i> price discriminate internationally if and only if the foreign market is sufficiently...