This paper considers the allocation of indivisible goods among members of a collective assuming that individuals are given the right to retain certain goods when some individuals alter the allocation problem. The assignment of rights is exhaustive in that, for every good x, either individual i...

The majority rule and the hierarchically dictatorial rule are both characterized when preferences are defined over two alternatives. The majority rule is characterized in terms of seven axioms. The hierarchically dictatorial rule is characterized in terms of six of these seven axioms and the...

The relative majority rule and the unanimity rule are characterized for the case in which there are only two alternatives. The main axioms are motivated by a principle of binary representativeness: the aggregation of the preferences of n voters is the result of splitting the n voters into two...

The (relative) majority rule is a benchmark collective decision norm. This paper provides a simple characterization of the majority rule, for the two-alternative case, that relies on the following property: the choice prescribed by the rule to a group I of individuals must be the one that would...

The Hirsch index is a number that synthesizes a researcher’s output. It is defined as the maximum number h such that the researcher has h papers with at least h citations each. Two axiomatic characterizations of this index are suggested. One of them provides a simple conceptualization of the...

The problem of allocating indivisible goods is considered when groups of individuals can make use of their power to plunder other groups. A monarch in a group of individuals is an individual who always obtains one of his most preferred goods. A Paretian condition together with a requirement of...

Two strict preference aggregation mechanisms are suggested. One determines the collective preference from the most preferred to the least preferred alternative using as inputs the individuals' most preferred alternatives once the alternatives already assigned a position in the collective...

The effects on the market price of a change in the number of buyers, in the number of sellers, in the prices sellers set and in the buyers’ reservation prices are established in a simple network model of a market.

Voting operators map n-tuples of subsets of a given set X of candidates (the voters’ choices) into subsets of X (the social choice). This paper characterizes dictatorial voting operators by means of three conditions (the non-emptiness condition A1, the independence condition A2 and the...