As auctions are becoming the main mechanism for selling advertisement space on the web, marketing agencies specialized in bidding in online auctions are proliferating. We analyze theoretically how bidding delegation to a common marketing agency can undermine both revenues and efficiency of the...

Using data from "WebsiteX", one of the largest online marketplaces in the world, we estimate a structural model of sponsored search auctions where bidders have heterogeneous click-through curves. Unlike earlier studies, our model accommodates two stylized empirical facts: the advertiser...

We systematically overview the literature in key word search and propose several promising research directions. The paper is organized by each agent in the search process: searchers, advertisers and the search engine, and reviews the key research issues for each. For each group, we outline the...

We consider an ad network's problem of allocating the auction for each individual impression to an optimal subset of advertisers, with the goal of revenue maximization. This is a variant of bipartite matching, except that advertisers may strategize by choosing their bidding profiles and their...

We investigate the VCG mechanism to which the locally envy-free Nash equilibria (LEFNE), vindictive bidding, and retaliating are applied. In order to evaluate performances of different bidding strategies with which an advertiser will acquire the same position, we define a novel so-called...