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We study information acquisition in a framework characterized by strategic complementarity or substitutability. Agents’ actions are based on costly public and private signals, the precisions of which are set by a policy maker and by private agents, respectively. The policy maker – acting as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838442
How should firms be incentivized to adopt new technologies when the technical merits and spillovers of such technologies are uncertain? We show that, when information is dispersed but exogenous, efficiency can be induced with simple (constant) subsidies. When, instead, firms must also be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014550306
We study information acquisition in a flexible framework with strategic complementarity or substitutability in actions and a rich set of externalities that are responsible for possible wedges between the equilibrium and the efficient acquisition of information. First, we relate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352847
In a beauty contest framework, we show that a more precise public information is welfare enhancing when increasing the precision of private information is costly. The accuracy of public information is chosen by the public authority taking into account that an increase in the precision of public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011082069
We study the welfare implications of public information precision in a beauty contest framework allowing for optimal stabilization policies and information obfuscation. When policy makers’ ability to obfuscate information is constrained, increasing public information precision can be welfare...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906357
We study information acquisition in a exible framework with strategic complementarity or substitutability in actions and a rich set of externalities that are responsible for possible wedges between the equilibrium and the efficient acquisition of information. First, we relate the (in)efficiency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010583646
In a beauty contest framework, public authorities decide the accuracy of public information evaluating how it affects individual actions and private information acquisition. More precise public information increases welfare whenever its marginal cost does not exceed that of private information.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005158856
We study information acquisition in a flexible framework with strategic complementarity or substitutability in actions and a rich set of externalities that are responsible for possible wedges between the equilibrium and the efficient acquisition of information. First, we relate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011275194
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008071349
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008883908