A long-standing open question raised in the seminal paper of Kalai and Lehrer (1993) is whether or not the play of a repeated game, in the rational learning model introduced there, must eventually resemble play of exact equilibria, and not just play of approximate equilibria as demonstrated...

Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play. Roughly, these are ε-best reply dynamics where ε is the maximal regret, which vanishes with time. This allows for alternative and sometimes much shorter proofs of known results on convergence of no-regret dynamics...

We study a continuous-time problem of public good contribution under uncertainty for an economy with a finite number of agents. Each agent aims to maximize his expected utility allocating his initial wealth over a given time period between private consumption and repeated but irreversible...

The theory of games (or game theory) is a mathematical theory that deals with the general features of competitive situations. It involves strategic thinking, and studies the way people interact while making economic policies, contesting elections and other such decisions. There are various types...

If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator...

In this paper we review some basic results on linear quadratic differential games.We consider both the cooperative and non-cooperative case.For the non-cooperative game we consider the open-loop and (linear) feedback information structure.Furthermore the effect of adding uncertainty is...

This book serves as an introduction to game theory for students with no prior game theory knowledge, or with limited background in economics and mathematics. It is specifically designed to provide an intuitive and accessible interdisciplinary approach to game theory, while simultaneously...

In nash equilibrium, agents are autarchic in their optimization protocol, whereas in Kantian equilibrium,they optimize in an interdependent way. Typically, researchers into the evolution of homo economicus treat preferences as being determined by selective adaptation, but hold fixed the...

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It is found that the “Theory of Moves” is adequate in a Cold War scenario, with functionally equal participants, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The destabilization of normal incentive systems, under power and information asymmetry, is what prevents an equilibrium from being reached, as...