We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition. A new product of initially unknown quality is introduced in the market, and purchases of the product yield information on its true quality. We assume that the performance of the new product is publicly observable....

We survey the literature on multi-armed bandit models and their applications in economics. The multi-armed bandit problem is a statistical decision model of an agent trying to optimize his decisions while improving his information at the same time. This classic problem has received much...

This note constructs an efficient mechanism for finding the best candidate for a committee from a sequence of potential candidates. Committee members have independent private values information about the quality of the candidate. The mechanism selects the best candidate according to the standard...

We develop the marginal contribution mechanism in detail for a sequential auction of a single object in which each bidders learn over time her true valuation of the object. We show that a modified second price auction leads to truthtelling.

We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient...

We survey the recent literature on the role of information in mechanism design. First, we discuss an emerging literature on the role of endogenous payoff and strategic information for the design and the efficiency of the mechanism. We specifically consider information management in the form of...

We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of a simple dichotomy. In a mass market, prices are declining over time. In a niche market, the optimal prices are initially...

We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent) any feasible individually rational payoff...