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A Characterization of Plurality-Like Rules Based on Non-Manipulability, Restricted Efficiency, and Anonymity
Ju, Biung-Ghi - Department of Economics, University of Kansas - 2005
weak orderings¡±. We characterize a family of ¡°plurality-like¡± rules based on strategy-proofness, restricted efficiency … indifference. We also characterize a wide spectrum of rules dropping anonymity or restricted efficiency. …, anonymity, and two weak axioms pertaining to the variable agenda feature of our model, called dummy independence and division …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005115536
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Characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
Morimoto, Shuhei; Serizawa, Shigehiro; Ching, Stephen - 2010
We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332300
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Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
Reffgen, Alexander; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3, pp. 663-688
In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set $A = A_1\times\cdots\ldots{}A_m$ of $m$ finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over $A$, namely for the domains...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599473
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Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
Reffgen, Alexander; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 663-688
In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set $A = A_1\times\cdots\ldots{}A_m$ of $m$ finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over $A$, namely for the domains...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689054
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Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
Reffgen, Alexander; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3
In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set $A = A_1\times\cdots\ldots{}A_m$ of $m$ finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over $A$, namely for the domains...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009277145
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On the Shapley-Scarf Economy: The Case of Multiple Types of Indivisible Goods
Konishi, Hideo; Quint, Thomas; Wako, Jun - Department of Economics, Boston College - 2000
We study a generalization of Shapley-Scarf's (1974) economy in which multiple types of indivisible goods are traded. We show that many of the distinctive results from the Shapley-Scarf economy do not carry over to this model, even if agents' preferences are strict and can be represented by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005074065
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Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
Barberà, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2009
A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168498
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Inefficiencies on Linking Decisions
Hortala-Vallve, Rafael - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2007
, at the limit, ex-ante efficiency can be achieved. In a voting situation this implies that the agents` intensity of … implementable mechanisms and show that ex-ante efficiency can never be achieved. We then proceed to relax the efficiency requirement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051104
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Individual versus group strategy proofedness: when do they coincide?
Barberà, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009
A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773123
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Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population
Kelly, Jerry S.; Qi, Shaofang - In: Economics letters 146 (2016), pp. 39-41
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011619018