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Order Monotonic Solutions for Generalized Characteristic Functions

Brink, René van den; González-Aranguena, Enrique; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

-796. Generalized characteristic functions extend characteristic functions of 'classical' TU-games by assigning a real …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257247

Characterizing the Core via k-Core Covers

Sánchez-Rodríguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

. Furthermore, full characteriz ations of games for which a k-core cover is nonempty and for which a k-core cover coincides with the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257257

A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects

Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

project game determines a set of stable allocations of the total reward (penalty). In the definition ofproject games, surplus …. It turns out that project games are related to bankruptcy and taxation games.This relation allows us to establish the … nonemptiness of the core of project games. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257261

Games with a Local Permission Structure: Separation of Authority and Value Generation

Brink, Rene van den; Dietz, Chris - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

group games are a special class of games with a permission structure. However, peer group games are also a special class of … (weighted) digraph games. To be specific, they are digraph games in which the digraph is the transitive closure of a rooted tree …. In this paper we first argue that some known results on solutions for peer group games hold more general for digraph …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257309

A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games

Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

we provide a strategic implementation of the average tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257390

Harsanyi Solutions in Line-graph Games

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Vasil'ev, Valeri - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003

structure. These are so-called line-graph games beingcooperative TU-games in which the players are linearly ordered.Examples of … players. We apply the concept of Harsanyi solution toline-graph games. We define four properties that each selectsa unique …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257395

Auctioning and Selling Positions: A Non-cooperative Approach to Queuing Conflicts

Brink, Rene van den; Chun, Youngsub; Ju, Yuan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'Journal of Economic Theory', 2014, 153, 33-45. Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257404

Axiomatizations of Permission Values for Games with a Hierarchical Permission Structure using Split Neutrality

Brink, René van den - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003

also ''An Axiomatization of the Conjunctive Permission Value for Games with a Hierarchical Permission Structure'', in … relations. Examples are auctions, airport games, sequencing situations, the water distribution problem and hierarchically … structured firms. This paper is about games with permission structure being a general game theoretic model to study situations …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257453

Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities

Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010

This discussion paper led to a publication in <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069611001574">, 'Journal of Environmental Economics and Management'</A>, 63(3), 388-403.In this paper we consider the problem of sharing water from a river among a group of agents (countries, cities, firms) located along the river. The benefit of each agent depends on...</a>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257471

Distributing Dividends in Games with Ordered Players

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Vasil'ev, Valeri - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007

cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff vectors to every … new solution concept for games with ordered players, called the Restricted Harsanyi set, is fully characterized by a … solution concept resulting from adapting the concept of Selectope to games with ordered players. Some applications show the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257497