We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with...

We consider the efficient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modelling interdependent preferences distinguishing between "payoff types" and "belief types" and report a characterization of when the efficient allocation...

This essay is the introduction for a collection of papers by the two of us on "Robust Mechanism Design" to be published by World Scientific Publishing. The appendix of this essay lists the chapters of the book. The objective of this introductory essay is to provide the reader with an overview of...

We consider the efficient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modeling interdependent preferences distinguishing between "payoff types" and "belief types" and report a characterization of when the efficient allocation...

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages lead to outcomes that agree with the social choice function for all beliefs at every type profile. In an interdependent-value environment with...