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The performance of core-selecting auctions : an experiment
Heczko, Alexander; Kittsteiner, Thomas; Ott, Marion - 2018
perform better than the Vickrey auction. The proportions of efficient allocations are similar in both types of auctions, but …-selecting auction. We trace the causes of the performance differences back to patterns in bids. The core-selecting auctions provide …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011834032
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The longer term refinancing operations of the ECB
Linzert, Tobias; Nautz, Dieter; Bindseil, Ulrich - 2004
that LTROs do neither lead to market distortions nor to unfair auction outcomes. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011604405
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Number of Bidders and the Winner’s Curse in Toll Road Concessions: An Empirical Analysis
Athias, Laure; Nuñez, Antonio - Fachgebiet Wirtschafts- und Infrastukturpolitik (WIP), … - 2006
In this paper, we empirically assess the effects of the winner’s curse in auctions for road concession contracts. Such auctions are private- and common-value auctions, and they are on concession contracts which are incomplete contracts prone to pervasive renegotiations (Guasch 2004, Engel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212647
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Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner’s Curse?: An Experimental Study
Ivanov, Asen; Levin, Dan; Niederle, Muriel - Department of Economics, School of Business
We use a second-price common-value auction, the maximal game, to experimentally study whether the Winner’s Curse (WC …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005481561
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The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions
Athias, Laure; Nunez, Antonio - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
We empirically assess the winner’s curse effect in auctions for toll road concessions. First, we investigate the overall winner’s curse effects on bidding behaviour. Second, we account for differing levels of common-value components. Third, we investigate whether the possibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005059108
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Optimal Common Value Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders
Singh, Rajdeep; Povel, Paul - Econometric Society - 2004
second-price sealed bid auction that lets the insider win only if his bid is above a hurdle price …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699653
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SINGLE OBJECT AUCTIONS WITH INTERDEPENDENT VALUES
Trifunović, Dejan - In: Economic Annals 56 (2011) 188, pp. 125-125
auction forms could be ranked in terms of expected revenue when signals that bidders have about the value of the object are … conditions that have to be met for English auction with asymmetric bidders to allocate the object efficiently. Finally, common …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011039112
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Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets
Matros, Alexander - In: Economics Letters 115 (2012) 3, pp. 500-503
This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a “good” project even if the insider has informational advantage.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041778
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The Winner’s Curse: Conditional Reasoning & Belief Formation
Koch, Christian; Penczynski, Stefan P. - Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität Mannheim - 2015
with the help of two experimental manipulations. First, we compare results from a very simple common-value auction game … assistance in belief formation changes subjects’ play significantly in the auction game. Overall, the results suggest that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011167101
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Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
Haile, Philip A.; Hong, Han; Shum, Matthew - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the “winner’s curse” arises only in common … expectation of the value of winning the auction. Equilibrium behavior implies that in a private values auction these expectations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570327