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seller the right to decide whether or not trade takes place. Our result does not rely on "renegotiation design" but takes the … renegotiation game as exogenously given. Furthermore, we characterize an interesting class of cases in which renegotiation is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005028234
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005028353
The paper argues that the allocation of ownership rights affects the distribution of information. This can explain some differences in efficiency between a nationalized and a privatized firm. Suppose the government wants to commit to a subsidy scheme which gives some cost- saving incentives to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032107
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753096
This article analyzes a much debated clause in the 1996 coalition contract between SPD and F.D.P. in Rheinland-Pfalz. Two parties write a contract, based on which decisions under incomplete information have to be made at a later point in time. It is shown that a complex complete contract can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005620143
We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010598911
We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010583866
We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010585795
More than twenty years have elapsed since Oliver Hart's Fisher-Schultz lecture on the topic of incomplete contracts. Incomplete contract theory (ICT) has become a rigorous and widely used approach in dealing with various issues. It's applications include firm theory (hierarchies, ownership and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568631
When drawing up a contract, it is often impracticable to specify all the possible relevant contingencies, and so contracts are typically incomplete. This paper considers the extent to which these gaps might be filled by building into the contract a mechanism for revising the terms of trade. One...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281283