) firms choose their output levels noncooperatively. We show that, in our model, collusion is easier to sustain the larger the … a firm is only willing to collude when otherwise collusion cannot be sustained. …

first investigate the extent to which collusive agreements are feasible. Secondly, we focus on collusion sustainability in … an infinitely repeated game. We show that, regardless of the degree of cost asymmetry, at least some collusion is always … sustainable. Finally, the degree of collusion is also endogeneised to show that cooperation has an upper bound determined by the …

agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this …, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion. …

-disclosure relation is diminished when tacit collusion is less feasible (industries with many firms, variable demand, and variable cost …

, collusion …

, collusion …