How do parties in ongoing repeated negotiation relationships react to changing circumstances? We argue that situations that become more beneficial (i.e. offer potentially higher outcomes to both) can affect negotiatorsacute; relationships in two distinct ways. On the one hand, negotiators may see...

How does a representative's position in the group influence behaviour in intergroup negotiation? Applying insights from the social identity approach (specifically self-categorization theory), the effects of group member prototypicality, accountability, and group attractiveness on competitiveness...

Intergroup conflict presents a complicated situation, in which resolution success depends largely on representative negotiators' motivation to process large quantities of information. Four intergroup negotiation experiments demonstrate that such information processing motivation is shaped by the...

The present paper builds on social comparison theory and the motivated information processing model to explain negotiation behavior and outcomes in two different economic contexts: for better or for worse. Across two experiments (scenario and repeated negotiations) results show that negotiating...

Across 2 experiments, the authors examined how improving or worsening sequences of outcomes and social motivation shape the relationship between negotiators. In study 1, using a questionnaire, participants evaluated increasing sequences as more beneficial to negotiators' relationship than...

In three experiments, we examined how people negotiate on behalf of a constituency in which opposing factions send different signals. Participants negotiated as sellers on behalf of a group consisting of factions that favored either a cooperative or a competitive negotiation. Experiment 1 (N =...

How does a representative's position in the group influence behavior in intergroup negotiation? Applying insights from social identity theory, the effects of group member prototypicality, process accountability, and group attractiveness on competitiveness in intergroup bargaining were...

Economic and social psychological models of human behavior suggest that concern with one's reputation limits strategic misrepresentation in social decision making. The authors tested this assumption in 2 experiments. In Exp. 1 (N = 86) participants gave more deceitful information under anonymity...