We study the allocation problem of an indivisible object to one of several agents on the full preference domain when monetary transfers are not allowed. Our main requirement is strategy-proofness. The other properties we seek are Pareto optimality, non-dictatorship, and non-bossiness. We provide...

In a model of school choice, we allow school priorities to be weak and study the preference revelation game induced by the immediate acceptance (IA) rule (also known as the Boston rule), or the IA game. When school priorities can be weak and matches probabilistic, three stability notions - ex...

As school districts integrate charter schools for centralized admissions in Denver, New Orleans, Newark and Washington D.C., some charter schools have stayed out of the system. This is counterintuitive as centralized clearinghouses are deemed beneficial to schools as well as students. We provide...

We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous ‘disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under...

This paper shows that Smith has applied a wrong theory to explain public good financing. The result will be insufficient fund for any public project. Instead of encouraging people to honestly reveal their preference, Smith is encouraging them to cheat

This paper shows how VL Smith has destroyed his own perfect theory. Smith used utility maximization to prove that the last person must take up the balance of a public construction cost. When the resulting equilibrium quantity is different from the given one, a new average quantity breaks up the...

A desirable house allocation rule is flexible in its response to changes in agents' preferences. We propose a specific notion of this flexibility. An agent is said to be `swap-sovereign' over a pair of houses at a profile of preferences if the rule assigns her one of the houses at that profile...

We reinterpret the `bossiness' of a private-goods allocation rule (Satterthwaite and Sonneschein, 1981) as the ability of an agent to `influence' another's welfare with no change to her own welfare. We propose simple conditions on (1) which agents may have influence (`acyclicity' and...

We study an infinite-horizon multilateral bargaining game in which the status quo policy, players' recognition probabilities, and their voting weights are endogenously determined by the previous bargaining outcome. With perfectly farsighted players, we show that the equilibrium long-run outcome...

We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents' preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a...