In this paper, we investigate the damage to real-sector investment spending and corporate financing activities triggered by the failure of three major investment banks during the 2007-09 financial crisis. We find that firms characterized by pre-crisis corporate investment banking relationships...

This volume collects almost two decades of joint work of Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell on game dynamics and equilibria. The starting point was the introduction of the adaptive strategy called <i>regret-matching</i>, which on the one hand is simple and natural, and on the other is shown to lead to...

<em>Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market ¡ª Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining</em> consists of selected research in bargaining carried out by Kalyan Chatterjee by himself and with various co-authors. Chatterjee has been one of the earliest researchers to work on noncooperative...

Kidney transplants across the blood-group barrier are medically feasible even if blood-group compatibility is preferred from a medical point of view. However, these types of transplants are motivated by the fact that they help in increasing the number of kidney transplants with living donors....

We consider a matching model in which individuals belonging to two populations (\textquotedblleft males\textquotedblright\ and \textquotedblleft females\textquotedblright ) can match to share their exogenous income risk. Within each population, individuals can be ranked by risk aversion in the...

In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we allow for a general meeting technology and show that its properties crucially affect the mechanism that sellers select in equilibrium. In general, it is optimal for sellers to post an auction without a reserve price but with a fee,...

This paper investigates the effect of focal points and initial relative position in the outcome of a bargaining process. We conduct two on-line experiments. In the first experiment we attempt to replicate Güth, Huck and Müller's (2001) results about the relevance of equal splits. In our second...

We study the problem of allocating workers to different projects in which each project requires having a minimum number of workers assigned to it or else it does not open. We show that the well-known serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy-proof nor Pareto efficient. Thus, we propose...

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by filling its slots...

In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over students. These priority orderings depend on criteria such as whether a student lives within walking distance or has a sibling already at the school. We argue that by including just the priority orderings in the problem, and not...