We study a receiver's learning problem of choosing an informative test in a signaling environment. Each test induces a signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on the receiver's information, a test has an indirect effect through the sender's signaling strategy. We show that the...

This paper introduces and analyzes sequentially stable outcomes in extensive games. An outcome ω is sequentially stable if for any ε 0, any version of the game where players make mistakes with small enough probability has a perfect ε-equilibrium with outcome close to ω. Unlike stable...

Two signaling games of monetary policy are considered: game one examines the effect of hysteresis on the labor market on the results of the repeated monetary policy game. Disciplinary effects of reputation disappear in presence of hysteresis. The second game compares weifare effects of monetary...

We study the structure of the rest points of signaling games and their dynamic behavior under selection-mutation dynamics by taking the case of three signals as our canonical example. Many rest points of the replicator dynamics of signaling games are not isolated and, therefore, not robust under...

This paper analyzes a reward system that uses a club good to promote recycling. In particular, we examine a context of incomplete information in which the administrator is unable to observe the resident's attitude towards recycling. The results suggest that despite the lack of information, the...

We propose a signaling model in which the central bank and firms receive information on cost-push shocks independently from each other. If the firms’ signals are rather unlikely to be informative, central banks should remain silent about their own private signals. If, however, firms are...

This half-semester course discusses decision theory and topics in game theory. We present models of individual decision-making under certainty and uncertainty. Topics include preference orderings, expected utility, risk, stochastic dominance, supermodularity, monotone comparative statics,...

We propose a signaling model in which the central bank and firms receive information on cost-push shocks independently from each other. If the firms’ signals are rather unlikely to be informative, central banks should remain silent about their own private signals. If, however, firms are...

Two signaling games of monetary policy are considered: game one examines the effect of hysteresis on the labor market on the results of the repeated monetary policy game. Disciplinary effects of reputation disappear in presence of hysteresis. The second game compares weifare effects of monetary...