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Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 257-267

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694986

Group robust stability in matching markets

Afacan, Mustafa Ogǔz - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008663538

Group Robust Stability in Matching Markets

Afacan, Mustafa Oguz - 2011

misreporting preferences and then rematching, by any group of students in the school choice type of matching markets. Our first … the acceptance of an appeal of a student to rematch after the announced matching. In this setting, we show that under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013126291

Robust stability in matching markets

Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 257-267

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009160971

Paying to match : decentralized markets with information frictions

Agranov, Marina; Dianat, Ahrash; Samuelson, Larry; … - 2021

We experimentally study decentralized one-to-one matching markets with transfers. We vary the information available to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415563

Improving transparency and verifiability in school admissions : theory and experiment

Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Raghavan, Madhav - 2023

Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477372