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Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - Revised version, April 2014

We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354632

Mechanism design and intentions

Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2016

We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore information structures that dier with respect to what is commonly known about the weight that agents attach to reciprocal kindness. When the designer has no information on reciprocity types, implementability of an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444226

Information Design in Coordination Games with Risk Dominant Equilibrium Selection

Ebert, Michael - 2020

We study the design of public information structures that maximize the probability of selecting a Pareto dominant equilibrium in symmetric (2 x 2) coordination games. Because the need to coordinate exposes players to strategic risk, we treat the designer as able to implement an equilibrium only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012838305

Incomplete information and costly signaling in college admissions

Salgado, Alfredo - 2018

We analyze a college admissions game with asymmetric information between students and colleges. Students' preferences for colleges depend on the observable quality of the schools. In contrast, colleges' preferences for students depend on the latter's abilities, which are private information....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012166000

Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games

Koessler, Frédéric; Mitra, Manipushpak - In: Games and economic behavior 48 (2004) 2, pp. 292-320

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002144540

Persistent divides in beliefs, conflict, and innovation

Mihailov, Alexander; Ōgaki, Masao - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012589720

Information independence and common knowledge

Gossner, Olivier; Kalai, Ehud; Weber, Robert - 2009

(statistically) disassociated from each other and how are such disassociations reflected in the agents' knowledge structure … disassociation under common knowledge (the agents' types are independent, conditional on some common-knowledge variable). Subjective … that disassociates types is more informative than any common-knowledge variable. With three or more agents, conditions (i …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282899

The value of information under unawareness

Galanis, Spyros - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 384-396

The value of information is examined in a single-agent environment with unawareness. Although the agent has a correct prior about events he is aware of and has a clear understanding of his available actions and payoffs, his unawareness may lead him to commit information processing errors and to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263576

E-Capacities and the Ellsberg Paradox.

Eichberger, J.; Kelsey, D. - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 1996

This paper introduces E-capacities as a representation of beliefs which incorporates objective information about the probability of events. It can be shown that the Choquet integral of an E-capacity is the Ellsberg representation. The paper further explores properties of this representation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357547

Uncertainty and Insurance in Strategic Market Games.

Weyers, S. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1996

In perfectly competitive economies under uncertainty, there is a well-known equivalence between a formulation with contingent goods and a formulation with state-specific securities followed by spot markets for goods. In this paper, I examine whether this equivalence carries over in a particular...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779547