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Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement

Kostadinov, Rumen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1471-1512

contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for incentive provision, despite the stationarity of the environment. Continuation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553

Contract, renegotiation, and holdup : an optimal contract when interim renegotiation is possible

Göller, Daniel - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 175 (2019) 4, pp. 736-764

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168524

Theoretical foundations of relational incentive contracts

Watson, Joel - In: Annual review of economics 13 (2021), pp. 631-659

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012612595

Theoretical foundations of relational incentive contracts

Watson, Joel - University of California, San Diego / Department of … - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012887517

Delegation with incomplete and renegotiable contracts

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2008 - This version: April 2008

It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001777