The voting rule proposed by Basset and Persky (Public Choice 99:299–310, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">1999</CitationRef>) picks the alternative with the best median evaluation. This paper shows that this MaxMed principle is equivalent to the MaxMin (so-called Rawls’) principle, with the proviso that one can discard half of the...</citationref>

The paper proposes a way to measure mechanical and psychological effects of majority runoff versus plurality electoral systems in candidate elections. Building on a series of laboratory experiments, we evaluate these effects with respect to the probability of electing a Condorcet winner...

Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment which used various evaluation...

This paper provides a theoretical foundation that supports the degressive proportionality principle in apportionment problems, such as the allocation of seats in a federal parliament. The utility assigned by an individual to a constitutional rule is a function of the frequency with which each...

The paper considers approval voting for a large population of voters. It is proven that, based on statistical information about candidate scores, rational voters vote sincerly. It is also proven that if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidate is elected.

This paper illustrates on two examples the use of some multivariate statistical analysis methods for describing profiles of preferences. The first example is the Social Choise and Welfare council election of 1999 and the second is a school-case fictious one. The school case example shows how...

This paper considers electoral competition between two office-motivated parties and one voter, in the presence of two alternative policies and under imperfect information. The theory of refinements of Nash equilibrium predicts the outcome of this three-player game: both parties faithfully use...