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Wir definieren die Arbeitsproduktivität als Ergebnis der arbeitsplatzspezifischen Höhe und Übereinstimmung von Anforderungen des Arbeitsplatzes und Eigenschaften/Kompetenzen des Bewerbers und verwenden den Gale-Shapley Algorithmus als dezentrale doppelte Auktion zur Zuordnung von...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009652737
Shapley Algorithmus ; doppelseitige Auktion ; Arbeitsmarkt ; Matching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009533828
This paper reviews recent developments in nonparametric identi.cation of mea- surement error models and their applications in applied microeconomics, in particular, in empirical industrial organization and labor economics. Measurement error models describe mappings from a latent distribution to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011445721
This paper reviews recent developments in nonparametric identi.cation of mea- surement error models and their applications in applied microeconomics, in particular, in empirical industrial organization and labor economics. Measurement error models describe mappings from a latent distribution to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010469057
the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366528
efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an employment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724521
We show that the class of preferences satisfying the Gross Substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982) is strictly larger than the class of Endowed Assignment Valuations of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673201
Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049
We study equilibria of dynamic over-the-counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and o ffers. Investors diff er with respect to information quality, including initial information precision, and also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003979498
In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we study how the properties of the meeting technology affect the mechanism that sellers select. In general, sellers have incentive to use mechanisms that are socially efficient. In our environment, sellers achieve this by posting an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010387737