We analyze a repeated game in which countries are polluting and investing in technologies. While folk theorems point out that the first best can be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium when the players are sufficiently patient, we derive the second-best equilibrium when they are not. This...

In this paper two cost sharing solutions for minimum cost spanning tree problems are introduced, the degree adjusted folk solution and the cost adjusted folk solution. These solutions overcome the problem of the classical reductionist folk solution as they have considerable strict ranking power,...

We study strategies with one–period recall in the context of a general class of multilateral bargaining games. A strategy has one–period recall if actions in a particular period are only conditioned on information in the previous and the current period. We show that if players are...

In the current mobile world, repeated relationships (communities) must be self-sustained by its members. We formulate a framework in which some or all players strategically choose whether to repeat an N-person game or to terminate it. This dynamic game ends when a certain number of players...