We build a theory of political turnover in autocracies where citizens can only express their political preferences to remove the autocrat through costly mass protest. The disenfranchised are imperfectly informed about the autocrat's choice of economic institution. Workers only observe economic...

This paper presents an agency theory of revolutionary political transitions from autocracy to democracy. We model authoritarian economic policy as the equilibrium outcome of a repeated game between an elite ruling class and a disenfranchised working class, in which workers have imperfect...

This paper considers the role of asymmetric information in a political agency theory of autocratic economic policy making. Within the context of a static game, we analyze the strategic interaction between an elite ruling class that sets policy and an imperfectly informed disenfranchised class,...

<Para ID="Par1">This paper presents a theory of political instability in autocracies where the disenfranchised express their political preferences for a leadership replacement through costly political action. We focus on the business regulatory environment as an arena for autocratic rent-creation, as a source...</para>

This paper provides a political economic analysis of policy learning. We formally argue that Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) help to secure the legacy of a policy reform, which is more valuable for incumbents in politically polarized societies. We empirically examine the derived hypotheses...

This paper provides an analysis of how political factors affect the incidence of the evaluation of public policies, with a focus on Randomized Control Trial (RCT) experiments in international development. We argue that political environments where incumbents face greater electoral competition...