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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674462
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773115
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Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2011
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010545656
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599519
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392405
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2011
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392414
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535532
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Coalition Formation
Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - Elsevier
approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255412
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Coalition formation
Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - 2013
models of bargaining, to cooperative game-theoretic notions of the core, or notions of coalition-proofness in noncooperative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420285
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Chapter 5. Coalition Formation
Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 239-326). 2015
approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025454