Two game theoretic solution theories, the M1 (i) bargaining set and the M1 (im) modified bargaining set, were tested competitively in six three-person games with side-payments. Subjects were 90 males who participated in 30 bargaining groups. Results showed that M1 (im) is significantly and...

This article reports an experimental test of the M1 (im) Cooperative and M1 (im) Shapley bargaining set solutions in 3-person superadditive, sidepayment games with nonempty core. The results indicate that, on an overall basis, M1 (im) Cooperative has greater predictive accuracy than does M1 (im)...

This article defines two new solution concepts for non-sidepayment games - the λ-transfer nucleolus and the λ-transfer disruption value - and reports the results of an experiment testing their predictive accuracy against that of a third solution concept, the well-known λ-transfer value...

This article reports an experimental test that juxtaposes the von Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function v(S) against the homomollifier function h(S) proposed by Charnes et al. (1978). The test was conducted in the context of 5-person cooperative sidepayment non-constant-sum games with...