We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …

We consider non-cooperative bargaining on the division of a surplus under simple majority rule. We use the "open rule …" bargaining protocol as originally suggested by Baron and Ferejohn (1989): Proposals can be amended before they are voted on. It … is widely known that there are significant gaps in our understanding of open rule bargaining. In order to address these …

equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from theory are: a) Subjects under-exploit their bargaining power by being more … recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the … probabilities exhibits systematic deviations from theory. This suggests that subjects do not fully grasp the subtle effects …

This paper studies a finite horizon version of Baron and Ferejohn's (1989) majoritarian bargaining with incomplete … information. Our devised model essentially blends Spence's signaling and the coalition formation of majoritarian bargaining. The …) and the "coalition" concern in majoritarian bargaining (the higher the type, the lower the probability of being a member …

Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining … over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees …