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Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Vida, Péter; Forges, Francoise - 2011
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274917
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Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 1, pp. 95-123
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599477
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Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 1
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416868
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Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case
Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2013
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708889
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Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case
Vida, Péter; Forges, Francoise - CESifo - 2011
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008853866
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Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk : the two-player case
Vida, Péter; Forges, Françoise - 2011
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be …. -- Bayesian game ; cheap talk ; communication equilibrium ; correlated equilibrium ; pre-play communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009010498
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Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : The Two-Player Case
Vida, Peter - 2011
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128960
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Believing when credible : talking about future plans and past actions
Vida, Péter - 2015
whenever possible, thereby develop a theory of credible communication. Predictions confirm the longstanding intuition for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345781
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Commitments, intentions, truth and Nash equilibria
Schlag, Karl H.; Vida, Péter - 2013
model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before … are believed whenever possible. Applying our results to Aumann's Stag Hunt game we find that communication is useless if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200432
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Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
Meyer, Margaret A.; Moreno de Barreda, Inés; Nafziger, … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1203-1235
This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158784